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and show that if the technical risk is suﬃciently high, all ﬁrms
focus on the most valuable market segment. We then endogenize
t e c h n i c a lr i s kb ya l l o w i n gﬁr m st oc h o o s eb e t w e e nas a f ea n da
risky R&D technology. In equilibrium, ﬁrms either both target
t h em o s ta t t r a c t i v em a r k e tw i t ha tl e a s to n eﬁrm using the risky
technology or they choose diﬀerent niche projects and both apply
the safe R&D technology. We show that R&D spillovers lead to
more diﬀerentiated R&D projects and patent protection to less.
Project coordination within a RJV implies more diﬀerentiation,
and may be welfare-improving.
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mannheim.de.1 Introduction
It is reported from the pharmaceutical industry that the next ten years could
yield an astonishing 4000 to 5000 diﬀerent types of new drugs due to new
research techniques. Nevertheless, according to the Financial Times, the top
50 companies in that industry concentrate over 70 per cent of their R&D
expenditure in as few as 20 blockbuster drugs that, if successful, open es-
pecially large and proﬁtable market segments.1 In this paper we study the
strategic forces that lead ﬁrms in R&D intensive industries to concentrate in
such market segments in spite of increasing competition, and thereby forego
opportunities in smaller but less competitive niche segments. We argue that
the focus on the so-called blockbuster innovations stems from the stochastic-
ity inherent in R&D activities. That stochasticity is particularly important
in the pharmaceutical industry: only one or two compounds out of 10,000
evaluated ever get as far as getting a licence.2
Towards becoming more speciﬁc, consider the ongoing race to bring a
new type of cancer treatment to the market. The drugs, so-called EGFR in-
hibitors, do not cure cancer, but stop cancer cells from growing and spreading
to other parts of the body.3 Three drugs have made it to the ﬁnal trial phase
and are potentially valuable weapons in the battle against cancer. Interest-
ingly, these ﬁrms have chosen diﬀerent drug designs. AstraZeneca and OSI
Pharmaceuticals have developed drugs (Iressa and Tarceva, respectively) that
are more convenient to use than ImClone Systems’ Erbitux, as they can be
taken in pill-form instead of being injected. This is likely to make them
the ﬁrst choice for patients with lung cancer, the most common cancer form
(indeed, AstraZeneca and OSI Pharmaceuticals are primarily targeting this
group in their trials). Erbitux, on the other hand, is less likely to cause
diarrhea as a side eﬀect, which makes it more suitable against colon cancer,
a considerably less valuable market segment. This example is supposed to
highlight two points: ﬁrst, product diﬀerentiation matters; here, products
1See The Financial Times, January 3, 1998, p. 18 (London Edition). This is conﬁrmed
in a more recent report by Ansell and Sparker (1999). In the report, R&D in the phar-
maceutical industry is divided into 14 therapeutic areas. On average, the top 50 ﬁrms are
active in 5 of the 6 most popular therapeutic areas, but in less than 2 of the remaining 8
areas. Furthermore, 96 percent of the 50 biggest pharmaceutical companies concentrate
on research in cardiovascular treatment.
2BBC News Online,N o v . 2 1 , 2000: ”Drugs - a high-risk business” (available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk).
3For more information about EGFR inhibitors and the ﬁr m si n v o l v e di nt h em a r k e t
see: The Scientist, April 1, 2002: ”Closing in on Multiple Cancer Targets” (available at
http://www.the-scientist.com); Reuters Health Information, October 18, 2001: ” ”Smart
Bomb” Drugs Oﬀer Hope in Cancer Battle” (available at http://www.cancerpage.com).
1diﬀer by side eﬀects and convenience. Second, there is a tendency for ﬁrms
to agglomerate in the most proﬁtable market segment; here, that for the
treatment of lung cancer.
In our analysis of these phenomena, we consider ﬁrms’ decisions of which
products to target for innovation, and how these decisions depend on the
degree of technical risk, i.e. the likelihood that innovations are achieved.
We begin with a benchmark model in which the degree of technical risk
taken is exogenous. The ﬁrms’ product choice is here governed by the two
now standard competing forces. On the one hand, ﬁrms want to choose
products for which demand is high (the demand eﬀect). One the other hand,
ﬁrms want to evade competition by choosing to produce products for which
no other ﬁrm provides a close substitute; this favors a niche product (the
competition eﬀect). If, however, the degree of technical risk increases - that
is, the likelihood of achieving innovations goes down - the competition eﬀect
is attenuated and as a result there tends to be more agglomeration in the
most valuable market segment.
To formally demonstrate this intuition, we start from Hotelling’s (1929)
product diﬀerentiation framework. For identical known product qualities
provided risklessly by two ﬁrms, and quadratic transportation costs reﬂect-
ing consumers’ preferences, we know from d’Aspremont et al. (1979) that
duopolists always choose to oﬀer niche products at the opposite ends of the
market. However, with increases in the degree of technical risk, there is more
and more agglomeration, and if the degree of technical risk is suﬃciently
large, there is complete agglomeration at the mid point of the market. The
reason is that with an increase in (independent) technical risks, the risk of
facing the competitor decreases. From a welfare point of view, the duopolists
excessively concentrate (disperse) if innovation probabilities are low (high).
We then take the analysis one step further and endogenize the technical
risk as well. Firms now select their R&D technology: they can adopt either a
small innovation with certain success; or a larger innovation (higher product
quality) with uncertain success. We show that this leads to a feedback loop
between location choices and technical risk. More technical risk leads to more
clustering, and this makes risky projects more proﬁtable (in expectation).
Three types of equilibria may emerge. Either ﬁr m sc l u s t e ra n db o t ha d o p t
the risky R&D technology, or one ﬁrm does so whilst the other chooses the
safe technology; or the ﬁrms maximally diﬀerentiate and both adopt the safe
technology.
Straightforward extensions of the benchmark model yield further inter-
esting insights on the interplay between demand and competition eﬀects.
Firstly, contrasting standard arguments, the possibility of R&D spillovers
strengthens the competition eﬀect and thus leads to less agglomeration. The
2reason is that spillovers increase the probability of ﬁr m se n d i n gu pi na
duopoly. Secondly, patent protection which excludes the competitor weak-
ens the competitive eﬀect and thus leads to more agglomeration. Finally,
introducing research joint ventures in a particular and, in our view interest-
ing way by allowing ﬁrms to coordinate the location of their R&D eﬀort leads
ﬁrms to internalize the business-stealing externality and thus to agglomerate
less, which may contribute to welfare. While, as we will argue in detail in the
concluding section of our paper, the elements of strategic behavior consid-
ered in our model are diﬃcult to observe in principle, the outcomes sketched
above for the pharmaceutical industry are certainly in consonance with our
analytic ones.
The related theoretical literature is rich in papers on clustering in prod-
uct space. Bester (1998) and Vettas (1999), for example, look at a situation
where ﬁrms signal the quality of their products to imperfectly informed con-
sumers, and show how this might lead to agglomeration. In our model,
consumers can perfectly observe the quality of the products, so signalling
does not play a role. The eﬀects leading to agglomeration in our model are
thus quite diﬀerent from those demonstrated by these authors.4 Our work is
most closely related to Harter (1993). Like us, Harter introduces R&D into
the Hotelling model. However, he only derives suﬃcient conditions for a clus-
tering equilibrium to arise, whence in our benchmark model, we are able to
fully characterize and evaluate all equilibrium outcomes. We also extend our
model to cover a number of issues not addressed by him. Most importantly,
we analyze the eﬀe c t so fa ne n d o g e n o u sc h o i c eo fR & Dt e c h n o l o g y .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we present our benchmark model. We determine and characterize the price
equilibrium, the location equilibrium, and welfare outcomes. In section 3, we
endogenize technical risk by allowing ﬁrms to choose the riskiness of their
R&D project. Then, in section 4 we consider a number of smaller extensions.
The concluding section serves to summarize our results and to comment on
their empirical veriﬁability. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Benchmark Model
We employ the standard Hotelling (1929) duopoly model in the version of
d’Aspremont et al. (1979). The market area is described by the unit in-
terval M =[ 0 ,1]. There is a unit mass of consumers with locations that
are uniformly distributed on M. Two ﬁrms i = A,B are potentially active
in this market at locations of supply denoted a,b ∈ M, a ≤ b.C o n s u m e r s
4We will relate to other papers in the appropriate places.
3buy at most one unit of the product and incur quadratic distance costs of
overcoming space. Thus a consumer located at y derives net utility
UA(a,qA,p A,y)=qA − pA − t(a − y)
2
when buying good A and a corresponding utility when buying B. qi and pi
are the quality and the price of ﬁrm i’s product, respectively. t>0 reﬂects
the degree of consumer heterogeneity or horizontal product diﬀerentiation.
All variables are common knowledge.
Firms costlessly invest in R&D.5 If ﬁrm i0s project succeeds, it sells a
product of quality qi, i = A,B produced at zero marginal cost. In the
benchmark model, ﬁrms succeed with the probability ρ and produce the
same quality if successful, qA = qB = q.B o t hρ and q are exogenously given.
Thus, ﬁrms face the same technical risk. The ﬁrms’ success probabilities
are uncorrelated. There is no fall-back quality. Hence, if the project is
unsuccessful, the ﬁrm remains inactively in the market.6 Firms have no
production costs.
As to the timing, ﬁrms ﬁrst simultaneously choose their locations (a,b).
Then the outcomes of their R&D are realized. Finally, ﬁrms set prices si-
multaneously, consumers buy one of the available products, and proﬁts are
realized.
Before continuing to the analysis, we would like to point out that our
benchmark model is similar to Harter (1993). He also starts from the Hotelling
framework, but considers a R&D technology based on a Poisson discovery
process. The main advantages of our framework are that it allows to solve for
the full set of location equilibria,7 to perform a welfare analysis and, most
importantly, it allows for the many extensions we consider in the ensuing
sections of the paper.
2.1 Price Equilibrium for given Qualities and Loca-
tions
Depending on the outcome of the R&D process after the location is ﬁxed,
the typical ﬁrm may produce and sell a product at positive quality, or it may
5Introducing a small ﬁxed cost of R&D would not change the results.
6Thus, we think of a situation where ﬁrms active in other markets explore the possibility,
via engaging in R&D, of becoming active in the market under scrutiny. The possibility of
a fall-back product if R&D fails is discussed in section 4.4.
7Harter ﬁnds necessary conditions for ﬁrms to target products in the center of the
market. The solution is characterized further for some parameter values, but it is not
possible to solve for the full set of location equilibria in his framework.
4remain inactive if unsuccessful. If successful, it may either be a monopolist
or a duopolist, depending on the success or failure of its competitor.
In the present stage, the ﬁrms’ locations and product qualities are known
and taken as given when ﬁrms set their prices. It is entirely standard to derive
the monopoly and the duopoly prices, so we cut short our presentation. For
future reference to be used in the extensions, we calculate equilibrium prices
and proﬁts allowing for quality diﬀerences between the ﬁrms’ products.
2.1.1 Monopoly Pricing
Let without loss of generality only ﬁrm A,l o c a t e da ta ≤ 1
2 succeed in de-
veloping a product of quality qA. The then monopolist maximizes its proﬁt,
pDM(qA,a,p). Under the assumption qA ≥ 3t used henceforth, the monopo-
l i s tc h a r g e st h ep r i c epM
A = qA−t(1−a)2 and covers the market. Since under
this assumption all consumers are served, the monopoly proﬁt ΠM(qA,a) is
equivalent to the monopoly price.
2.1.2 Duopoly Pricing
Here both ﬁrms conduct successful R&D, resulting in qualities qA and qB,
respectively. By the aforementioned assumption, the market is covered. The
ﬁrms’ Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices are given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (i) For qA − qB < −t(b − a)(2 + a + b), ﬁrm B is the only ﬁrm
with positive market share. The unique price equilibrium is
p
D
A(a,b,qA,q B)=0 and (1)
p
D
B(a,b,qA,q B)=qB − qA − t(b
2 − a
2). (2)
(ii) For −t(b−a)(2+a+b) <q A −qB <t (b−a)(4−a−b),t h eﬁrms share












(qB − qA + t(b − a)(4 − a − b)).
(iii) For qA − qB >t (b − a)(4 − a − b), ﬁrm A is the only ﬁrm with positive
market share. The unique price equilibrium is
p
D
A(a,b,qA,q B)=qA − qB − t(b − a)(2 − a − b) and (4)
p
D
B(a,b,qA,q B)=0 . (5)
5The proof is entirely standard. Not unexpectedly, Lemma 1 demonstrates
that if there are substantial quality diﬀerences relative to the transportation
cost t, the low quality ﬁrm is driven out of the market by the high quality
one.
Using Lemma 1, we can derive the equilibrium proﬁts. In case (i) where
ﬁrm A is inactive, the proﬁts are given as
Π
D





A(a,b,qA,q B)=0 .( 7 )
Similarly, if ﬁrm B is inactive as in case (iii), the proﬁts are
Π
D
A(a,b,qA,q B)=qA − qB − t(b − a)(2 − a − b) and (8)
Π
D
B(a,b,qA,q B)=0 .( 9 )










(qB − qA + t(b − a)(4 − a − b))2
18t(b − a)
.
This completes the analysis of price competition in the market place.
2.2 Location under Stochastic R&D Outcomes
2.2.1 The Equilibrium
The ﬁrms’ location decisions are taken before the outcomes of their R&D
eﬀorts become known. Each of the ﬁrms innovates with probability ρ.E x -
pected proﬁts are









i and equation (6)-(10), we obtain the ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm
A when choosing its location a.I t c a n b e s h o w n t h a t ﬁrm A’s problem is
concave, so solving the ﬁrst order condition, we ﬁnd the optimal location of
ﬁrm A as a function of the location of ﬁrm B. The equilibrium is derived
formally in Proposition 1.
6Proposition 1 Consider the choice of location in the ﬁrst stage of the game.
i) For ρ ≤ 2
















13, the unique equilibrium locations with a ≤ b are a∗ =0and
b∗ =1 .
The equilibrium outcome can be interpreted in terms of the trade-oﬀ
between the demand and the competition eﬀect. The former provides in-
centives to move to the center of the market, and the latter away from it.
D’Aspremont et al. (1979) show that if both ﬁrms are active with certainty,
the competition eﬀect dominates, so ﬁrms locate as far as possible from each
other. However, in our model, the ﬁrms foresee that if they enter the market,
they will only meet an active competitor with probability ρ.T h i s w e a k e n s
the competition eﬀect but not the demand eﬀect, as a ﬁrm beneﬁts from a
central location as an ex-post monopolist. Therefore, ﬁrms tend to cluster
in equilibrium, and this the more the smaller ρ. By contrast, if the technical
risk is low, the duopoly outcome becomes so likely that the competition eﬀect
starts to dominate and ﬁrms fragment in equilibrium. As in d’Aspremont et
al., that outcome does not depend on t.
2.2.2 Welfare
Is there too much, or too little clustering in equilibrium, as compared to the
locational choices of a surplus maximizing social planner? The following two
observations greatly simplify the calculation of the welfare maximizing loca-
tions. First, as the market is covered by assumption, we do not need to worry
about how many consumers buy the product. Second, as consumers exercise
unit demand, there is no deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing. There-
fore, the welfare optimal locations are simply those that minimize consumers’
expected transportation costs.













Ex-post, that is, after the R&D outcomes are realized, the optimal loca-












Figure 1: The equilibrium and the welfare maximizing locations.
monopolist’s welfare maximizing location is 1/2, and the duopolists’ ones are
a = 1
4 and b = 3
4, respectively. What does this imply for the ﬁrms’ ex-ante
welfare maximizing locations, i.e., before the outcomes of the R&D eﬀorts
are revealed? Let ρ, the probability that a ﬁrm innovates, become very small.
Then, if there is any innovation, the innovator will tend to be a monopolist,
resulting in an optimal location close to 1
2.A s ρ increases, the probability
that a duopoly arises increases. Therefore, the distance between the welfare
maximizing locations increases up to 1
2 for ρ =1 .
Comparing Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, we obtain immediately
Corollary 1 There exists a unique value e ρ =3 /2 −
p
15/28 ≈ 0.7681 such
that
i) ρ<e ρ implies a∗ <a w (b∗ >b w)
ii) ρ>e ρ implies a∗ >a w (b∗ <b w).
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between welfare maximizing (dashed)
and equilibrium (solid) locations. There is excessive product clustering for
low ρ (i.e. a high technical risk) and excessive dispersion for high ρ.
From a welfare point of view, an individual ﬁrm disregards the impact
of its location decision on its rival’s proﬁt and on consumer surplus. By
ignoring the negative externality on its rival a ﬁrm will always tend to locate
8too close to the center. The sign of the eﬀect on consumer surplus depends
on the expected market structure. In a monopoly ex post,c o n s u m e r sh a v ea
trade-oﬀ b e t w e e np r i c ea n dt r a n s p o r t a t i o nc o s t s .T h ef a r t h e ra w a yf r o mt h e
c e n t e rt h em o n o p o l i s ti sl o c a t e d ,t h el o w e rw i l lb ei t sp r i c eb u tt h eh i g h e r
will be the sum of the transportation cost across consumers. Under the
assumption of a covered market, q ≥ 3t,t h ep r i c ee ﬀect always dominates
and consumer surplus is maximized if the monopolist is located at one end
of the line. In a duopoly ex post, consumers are best oﬀ if ﬁrms are located
at 1/2.
Therefore, ex ante, if the technical risk is high (i.e. ρ low) and a monopoly
outcome likely, the individual ﬁrm’s marginal incentive to move to the center
is too strong both from consumers’ and the rival’s point of view; there is
excessive clustering. If the technical risk is low and a duopoly the likely
outcome, the individual ﬁrm’s marginal incentive to move away from the
center is too strong because the beneﬁts to the rival are outweighed by the
harm to consumers; there will be excessive dispersion.
3 Endogenous Risk-Taking in R&D
In the previous section, the ﬁrms’ technical risk was assumed to be exogenous
and symmetric. We now endogenize the technical risk by letting ﬁrms choose
among research paths with diﬀerent risks and returns. Due to technical re-
strictions, there is a limited number of (relevant) research paths that a ﬁrm
can follow. To simplify derivations, we assume that there are only two such
paths: a ’safe’ research path (or technology) (’S’) and a risky and innova-
tive path (’R’).8 Following the safe path, the ﬁrm develops with certainty a
product of quality q and thereby minimizes its own technical risk. Instead,
following the risky path, it develops with probability ρ a product of higher
quality q + ∆. The outcomes of risky R&D eﬀorts are again uncorrelated.
There is a ﬁxed cost of doing R&D that we normalize to zero. It is assumed
that the ﬁrms can only follow one of the paths.9 Hence, if a ﬁrm tries to
develop the high quality product but fails, it cannot switch to the low risk
strategy, and thus must stay inactive ex-post.
The ﬁrms simultaneously choose their location and R&D strategies. We
already have determined the equilibrium prices for given location and quali-
8The qualitative nature of the results of this section does not depend on the number
of available diﬀerent R&D paths.
9See, for example, Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Kamien and Schwartz (1978)
for a justiﬁcation of this assumption. Section 4.4 sketches a situation in which ﬁrms have
to choose location but can pursue both the safe and the risky research path.
9ties, so we only have to look for a Nash equilibrium jointly in locations and
R&D choices. We denote ﬁrm A’s strategy by sA =( a,zA), where a is the
location and zA ∈ {S,R} is the R&D project. Firm B’s strategy is denoted
in the same manner.
We ﬁnd the equilibrium of the game in two steps. First, we determine the
reaction functions in location and the equilibrium locations for given R&D
technologies. Afterwards, we determine the equilibrium of the overall game
where R&D technologies and locations are chosen simultaneously.
If both ﬁrms choose the safe strategy, we know from d’Aspremont et al.
that their equilibrium locations are at the opposite ends of the Hotelling
line. Proposition 1 speciﬁes the equilibrium locations conditional upon both
ﬁrms choosing the risky R&D path. However, if one ﬁrm chooses the safe
technology and the other the risky one, the reaction functions are highly
non-linear. Towards solving the model closed form we need to assume that
ρ ≤ 2
3 ≡ ρ. This excludes technologies that are successful with a very high
probability, i.e. close to riskless technologies. Close to riskless technology
choices should be well approximated by modelling riskless choices. Concen-
trating our analysis on suﬃciently risky R&D projects strikes us as more
interesting and novel. In the next lemma, we specify the location that a ﬁrm
with the risky technology would choose given the other ﬁrm’s location and
(safe) technology.
Lemma 2 Consider a candidate equilibrium, in which one ﬁrm, say, A
chooses the safe technology and locates at a ≤ 1
2 while B chooses the risky




a if ∆ ≥ (1 − a)(6 + a − 3
√
3+2 a)t
1 if ∆ < (1 − a)(6 + a − 3
√
3+2 a)t.
The best response for the safe technology ﬁrm is given by
Lemma 3 Consider a candidate equilibrium, in which one ﬁrm, say, A
chooses the safe technology while the other B chooses the risky one. Then,
ﬁrm A’s optimal location is 1/2.
T h eo p t i m a ll o c a t i o n so ft h et w oﬁrms are substantially diﬀerent for asym-
metric R&D choices. The reaction function of the high quality ﬁrm exhibits
an interesting discontinuity. For low quality improvements, it behaves as
’soft’ as possible, and goes to the end of the line to enjoy some local monopoly
power. However, once a certain threshold level of ∆ is reached, it chooses
the opposite strategy and behaves as ’tough’ as possible. It locates then at
t h es a m ep l a c ea st h el o wq u a l i t yﬁr m ,w h i c hi st h em o s tp r o ﬁtable way of
10driving the competitor out of the market. Notice that b∗ does not depend
on ρ,b e c a u s eﬁrm B takes the location decision conditional on entry. The
ﬁrm with the safe technology earns much higher proﬁtw h e ni ti sa l o n ei n
the market. Therefore, it chooses the location that maximizes the monopoly
proﬁt for all locations of the (potential) high quality competitor.
The next lemma summarizes the two possible candidate equilibria when
ﬁrms have asymmetric R&D technologies.
Lemma 4 The unique candidate equilibrium, in which one ﬁrm, say, A
chooses the safe technology while the other B chooses the risky one is {(1
2,S),(1,R)}
if ∆ ≤ t
4 and {(1
2,S),(1
2,R)}o t h e r w i s e .
We are now in the position to solve for the equilibria of the full game. For
given technology choices, we have identiﬁed four candidate equilibria. These
equilibria qualify as an equilibrium of the overall game if no ﬁrm has an
incentive to switch unilaterally its technology (and optimally adjust its loca-
tion). Denote the possible equilibria by {sA,s B} where the two entries refer
to ﬁrm A’s and ﬁrm B’s strategy, respectively. For notational convenience,



















(1 − ρ)(4q − t)
4ρ
.
Proposition 3 There exist three diﬀerent types of (pure strategy) Nash equi-
libria of the game:
i) {(1
2,R),(1




2,R)}a n d{ (1
2,R),(1
2,S)} are equilibria if and only if ∆∗
1 ≤ ∆ ≤
∆∗
3.
iii) {(0,S),(1,S)} is an equilibrium if and only if ∆ ≤ ∆∗
2.
Figure 2 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes. With low values of both
∆ and ρ, the expected return on the risky technology is so low that the ﬁrms
prefer choosing the safe technology, in which case the ﬁrms locate as far as
possible from each other. However, if the innovation step is larger than ∆∗
2
ﬁrms have an incentive to switch unilaterally to the risky technology and
diﬀerentiate maximally (minimally) for ∆ ≤ (≥)3(2 −
√
3)t. By contrast, if
both ∆ and ρ exhibit high values, the risky technology has a high expected
return and is chosen by both ﬁrms. The probability of being monopolist in
t h em a r k e ti ss u ﬃciently high that a ﬁrm only deviates to the safe technology
( a n ds t a y sa t1 / 2 )i f∆ ≤ ∆∗








Figure 2: Equilibrium Strategies in the ρ − ∆ Space
∆ and ρ,w eﬁnd equilibria where the ﬁrms choose diﬀerent technologies and
locate at the center of the market. The ﬁrm with the safe technology does
not deviate to the risky technology (with optimal location at 1/2) as long
as ∆ ≤ ∆∗
3. The optimal deviation of the ﬁrm with the risky technology
should be accompanied by a relocation to the end of the line. This is not
beneﬁcial for all ∆ ≥ ∆∗
1. Finally, note that for ∆ ≤ t/4, the fourth candidate
equilibrium {(1/2,S),(1,R)} is not an equilibrium of the overall game since
the risky technology ﬁrm always deviates to the safe technology.
>From the above follows that there is a non-empty subset of the para-
meter space, ∆∗
1 ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆∗
3, with two possible equilibria: {(0,S),(1,S)}a n d
{(1/2,S),(1/2,R)}. This multiplicity is due to the inherent interdependence
between risk-taking and clustering. The more technical risk there is in the
market (it suﬃces that one ﬁrm is taking the risk), the stronger is the in-
centive to cluster in the most proﬁtable segment. And the closer both ﬁrms’
R&D projects are, the more it pays to take risk, as a low quality competitor
is easier to drive out of the market. This feedback loop leads to the coexis-
tence of an equilibrium with niche projects and safe research paths and an
equilibrium where ﬁrms cluster and one is taking a risky research path. It
is easy to check that there is no Pareto ranking of these two equilibria since
the ﬁrm with the safe technology at the center prefers the clustering equilib-
12rium {(1/2,S),(1/2,R)} while the ﬁrm with the risky technology prefers the
dispersion equilibrium {(0,S),(1,S)}. However, industry proﬁts are higher
in the clustering equilibrium.
These results provide an interesting link to the literature on multi-dimensional
product diﬀerentiation. Here, it has been shown that ﬁrms tend to diﬀeren-
tiate maximally in one dimension and minimally in all other, see, e.g., Irmen
and Thisse (1998) and Neven and Thisse (1993). This is similar to what
happens in our model for low and intermediate values of ∆ and ρ. For low
values, ﬁrms diﬀer maximally in locations but choose the same R&D strat-
egy, whilst for intermediate values, locational diﬀerentiation is minimal but
the R&D strategies diﬀer. Yet this cannot happen for high values of ∆ and
ρ: since consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality, both ﬁrms
diﬀerentiate minimally in space, and prefer the risky technology as it has a
high expected pay-oﬀ.
The risk-return trade-oﬀ in R&D has also been studied by Bhattacharya
and Mookherjee (1986) and Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) among others.
They use general risk-return functions. However, to make the analysis tractable,
the authors restrict their attention to symmetric R&D choices by the ﬁrms
in the industry. In a less general model, we demonstrate that imposing sym-
metry might be quite restrictive. Indeed, our results suggest that ﬁrms have
incentives to diﬀerentiate themselves along the R&D dimension in order to
relax expected competition.10
The following corollary looks at the equilibrium outcome under a spe-
ciﬁc subset of the risky innovation technologies, namely all mean-preserving
spreads of the safe innovation technology.
Corollary 2 If the ﬁrms can choose between two technologies with the same




Hence, if the risky innovation is a mean-preserving spread of the safe
innovation, the possibility of ending up as a monopolist with the high quality
p r o d u c ti ss oa t t r a c t i v et h a tn oﬁrm wishes to pursue the safe R&D strategy.
3.1 Welfare
In order to calculate the welfare-maximizing technology and location choices
we will proceed as in the previous section. First, we determine the eﬃcient
locations for all possible technology choices and then we derive the overall
10Cabral (2003) also ﬁnds asymmetric equilibria in a model where the leader in the
market takes less R&D risk than the follower.
13eﬃcient technology and location pair. From Proposition 2 we know the
welfare maximizing locations when both ﬁrms adopt the risky technology.
Similarly, it is a standard result that the welfare maximizing locations are
a =1 /4 and b =3 /4 when both ﬁrms adopt the safe technology. The
remaining possibility is that one ﬁrm chooses the risky R&D strategy and
the other the safe one. Here, we need to take into account not only the
transportation costs, but also the quality of the products bought by the
consumers. We ﬁnd
Lemma 5 Suppose that ∆ ≥ t/4 and that one ﬁrm is endowed with the safe
technology and the other with the risky one. Then the welfare maximizing
locations are a = b = 1
2.
If ∆ ≥ t/4, it is welfare maximizing that all consumers buy the high
quality product whenever it is developed. The welfare maximizing locations
are thus a = b = 1
2. This ensures that the ﬁrm with the highest available
quality serves the whole market at the lowest possible transportation cost.
We are now in the position to compare the maximum welfare under the
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1 (ρ,t) < ∆ ≤ ∆W
2 (ρ,t),
{(aW,R),(bW,R)} for ∆ > ∆W
2 (ρ,t).
where aW and bW a r ea si nP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
The higher the expected return on the risky technology and the lower the
quality of the safe technology, the more ﬁrms should adopt the risky tech-
n o l o g y .N o t et h a tw eh a v en oa n a l y t i c a lr e s u l t sf o r∆ <t / 4,b u tn u m e r i c a l
examples conﬁrm the overall picture obtained for ∆ ≥ t/4.
How does the eﬃcient allocation compare to the equilibrium outcome of
Proposition 3? It is easy to show that
∆
W






2 (ρ,t) > ∆
∗
3(ρ,t)
Figure 3 shows the six resulting parameter regions. In all regions except for
region (i) and (ii) ﬁr m sc h o o s et h ee ﬃcient technologies but there might be
excessive dispersion (∆ < ∆W
1 (ρ,t)) or clustering (∆ > ∆W
2 (ρ,t))a sa l r e a d y
discussed above. More interestingly, we ﬁnd that in region (i) ﬁrms choose
technologies that are too safe from a welfare point of view, and in region (ii)







Figure 3: Equilibrium and eﬃcient strategies
For ∆W
1 ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆∗
1, the return on the risky technology is so low that it is
not privately proﬁtable for a ﬁr mt oa d o p ti te v e nt h o u g hi tw o u l di n c r e a s e
industry proﬁts and overall welfare. Each ﬁrm with the safe technology would
beneﬁt if the competitor would take up the risky option but no ﬁrm has an
incentive to do so. Therefore, we have too little risk-taking in region (i).
In region (ii) ﬁrms end up both choosing the risky technology although
total welfare would be maximized if one ﬁrm chose the safe technology. This
outcome can be understood by looking at a ﬁrm’s incentive to choose the risky
technology when the competitor has adopted the risky technology. Suppose,
15for example, that ﬁrm B plays the strategy sB = {1/2,R} in equilibrium.
Denote by πA(sA,s B) and W(sA,s B) the expected proﬁto fﬁrm A and the
expected welfare, respectively, as a function of the strategies played by the
ﬁr m s .F r o mt h ea n a l y s i sa b o v e ,w ek n o wt h a tt h eﬁr m sl o c a t ea tt h ec e n t e r .
Firm A adopts the risky technology if and only if
πA ({1/2,R},{1/2,R}) − πA ({1/2,S},{1/2,R}) ≥ 0 ⇔ (11)
(1 − ρ)(ρ(q + ∆ − t/4) − (q − t/4)) ≥ 0.
Turning to welfare we have
W ({1/2,R},{1/2,R}) − W ({1/2,S},{1/2,R}) ≥ 0 ⇔ (12)
(1 − ρ)(ρ(q + ∆ − E(t)) − (q − E(t))) ≥ 0,
where E(t)=t/12 is the average transportation cost.
Equation (11) and (12) look similar, because ﬁrm A only creates value for
itself and for society if ﬁrm B does not innovate. Still, they are not identical,
because a social planner considers the utility of all consumers whereas ﬁrm
A only considers the utility of the marginal consumer which determines the
price. Therefore, it is the transportation cost of the marginal consumer, t/4,
that enters in (11) but the average transportation cost that enters in (12).
Since the marginal consumer has lower utility than the average consumer,
ﬁrm A puts greater weight on the additional utility that the risky technology
can bring - relative to the risk of having no product - than a social planner
does. This, in turn, explains why there is excessive risk-taking in region (ii).
4O t h e r E x t e n s i o n s
In this section, we return (for technical reasons) to the baseline model to
study the eﬀect of patent protection and of technological spillovers; the eﬀects
of a research joint venture; and the eﬀects of endogenizing the R&D intensity.
We ﬁnally consider the eﬀects of a fallback option.
4.1 Patent Protection and Technological Spillovers
As discussed earlier, our model most appropriately reﬂects a situation in
which the ﬁrms think of introducing a brand new type of product and creating
a new market. Products of this type, such as a ﬁrst eﬀective drug against a
disease, are often protected by patent laws. It is thus interesting to know how
the optimal project choices in the benchmark model are aﬀected by patent
16protection. Patents introduce an element of ’winner-takes-all’ into the pay-
oﬀs. In particular, if both ﬁrms are successful in R&D, there is a probability
λ that one of the ﬁrms will be granted a patent that excludes the other ﬁrm
from the market. The ﬁr m sa r ee q u a l l yl i k e l yt ob et h el u c k yo n ea w a r d e d
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Proposition 5 summarizes the analysis of this modiﬁed game with patent
protection.
Proposition 5 Patent protection leads to (weakly) less dispersed locations.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward: patent protection
makes it more likely that the ﬁrms end up in a monopoly. This weakens
the competition eﬀect even more, with the demand eﬀect again unaﬀected.
Thus, clustering becomes more attractive.
Following the same logic, it is clear that any force preventing the monopoly
outcome from arising increases dispersion incentives. The most prominent
example is technological spillovers. In the literature, spillovers are typically
considered a centripetal force in models with product diﬀerentiation (e.g.,
Duranton, 2000; Mai and Peng, 1985). It thus seems worth highlighting the
eﬀect of spillovers on ﬁrms’ locations in our framework.
Assume that if one of the ﬁrms innovates, but the other one does not,
the unsuccessful ﬁrm receives a spillover that allows it to become active with
probability σ.12
Proposition 6 Technological spillovers lead to (weakly) more dispersed lo-
cations.
The formal argument is analogous to the patent protection one. Spillovers
decrease both ﬁrms’ technical risk so clustering becomes less attractive.13
The model thus provides an interesting contrasting view to the standard
11Under a ’ﬁrst-to-ﬁle’ patent system, one could imagine a sequential structure where
the ﬁrms were equally likely to ﬁle the patent ﬁrst. λ would be the probability that the
ﬁrm holding the patent would win a patent infringement case.
12Such spillovers may occur due to the use of common suppliers or to employees switching
job or talking informally; see Mansﬁeld (1985).
13Actually, while the reduction in the rival’s technical risk fosters diﬀerentiation, the
reduction in a ﬁrm’s own technical risk has no eﬀect on project choice since this decision
is taken conditional upon success in development.
17argument suggesting that knowledge spillovers lead to clustering in R&D
intensive industries.14
Notice that positive or negative correlation in R&D outcomes would have
an eﬀect similar to spillovers and patent protection, respectively.15 Hence, a
negative correlation between R&D outcomes would lead to more agglomera-
tion in equilibrium compared to the benchmark model, and positive correla-
tion to less agglomeration. Furthermore, if the degree of correlation depends
negatively on the distance between ﬁrms’ locations such that closer loca-
tions lead to higher positive correlation (without aﬀecting the probability
that a ﬁrm innovates), this deglomerating force is even stronger. Details are
available upon request.
4.2 Research Joint Venture
Ansell and Sparker (1999) provide detailed data on research alliances in the
pharmaceutical industry. The authors report more than ﬁfty research joint
ventures concluded in their 18-month snapshot from 1997 to 1998. Returning
to the benchmark model, we assume that the ﬁrms, by forming a research
joint venture (RJV), can coordinate their choice of location, but then compete
in prices.16 Given the price equilibria in Lemma 1, it is straightforward to
calculate the locations that maximize the joint expected proﬁts of ﬁrms.
Proposition 7 Consider a situation in which ﬁrms ﬁrst coordinate their
location choices and then compete in prices.
i) For ρ ≤ 1
















3 <ρ≤ 1, the unique equilibrium locations with a ≤ b are arjv =0
and brjv =1 .
14Choi (1993) makes a related point in the context of a research joint venture. He shows
that if forming a research joint venture increases technological spillovers, this will tend to
decrease industry proﬁts.
15Yet the eﬀects are not identical. Take the case of spillovers. With spillovers, the fact
that a ﬁrm fails to innovate does not contain information about the other ﬁrm’s likelihood
of failing, as it would if projects were positively correlated. A positive correlation in R&D
outcomes might occur for exogenous reasons (for example, the most promising research
path is evident to participants in the industry) or might be a strategic choice as in Cardon
and Sasaki (1998).
16The idea that ﬁrms collude in R&D through a research joint venture goes back to
Kamien et al. (1992).
18iv) A RJV is welfare improving for ρ ∈ (1
2,2 −
√
2) and welfare reducing for




In this semi-collusive arrangement, ﬁrms internalize the loss incurred by
the competitor as they move closer together in product space. Consequently,
ﬁrms always locate (weakly) further from each when they collude in loca-
tions.17 This explains why a RJV may be welfare improving for low values
of ρ where ﬁrms are clustering too much in the non-collusive equilibrium.
For large values of ρ, on the other hand, there is too much dispersion in
equilibrium and a RJV exacerbates this tendency.
4.3 Endogenous Costly R&D Intensity
As a third extension, consider now a continuous choice of R&D intensity.
Instead of choosing the risk proﬁle of their R&D activities, ﬁrms decide on
the technical risk by investing in the probability of success, ρi, for an inno-
vation of given size q.18 Suppose ﬁrms choose simultaneously R&D intensity
and location. For quadratic R&D costs, 1
2γρi
2, we ﬁnd a symmetric equilib-
rium where ﬁrms choose the same R&D intensity, i.e. ρA = ρB = ρ.T h i s
corresponds to the equilibrium in the benchmark model, since, for a given
equilibrium ρ, the location is as described in Proposition 1. However, the
crucial parameter is now γ.I fγ is high, R&D is relatively costly. Therefore,
the ﬁrms choose ρ low and locate together at the center of the line. On the
other hand, if γ is low, the ﬁrms choose ρ high and locate away from each
other. Unlike the benchmark model, there is the possibility of asymmetric
equilibria.19
4.4 A Fallback Product
In the benchmark model, we have assumed that a ﬁrm can not enter the
market if its R&D eﬀorts fail. We interpret this as a situation where the
17If, as in Choi (1993), forming a RJV would allow coordination but increase techno-
logical spillovers, ﬁrms would choose even more distant locations (or not form a RJV at
all).
18Ideally, one would include both R&D intensity and risk choice in the same model.
Unfortunately, this analysis is not tractable in our set-up. Incidentally, O’Donoghue,
Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) discuss exactly the same R&D decision as is modeled here,
but in a market that is only vertically diﬀerentiated.
19The general analysis of asymmetric equilibria is diﬃcult because of the functional
forms involved. We have, however, been able to ﬁnd suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of an asymmetric equilibrium where one ﬁrm locates at 1/2 and invests a lot in R&D
whereas the other ﬁrm locates at the end of the line and invests little in R&D.
19ﬁrms open a new market. We have considered a variation of the benchmark
model with a fallback product.20 I ti sn o tp o s s i b l et os o l v et h em o d e lw i t h
continuous location choice. Assuming instead that the ﬁrms can locate either
at the center or at the ends of the line, the ﬁrms agglomerate at the center if
the following two conditions are satisﬁed. First, ρ is neither close to 0 nor to
1 and, second, the product resulting from successful R&D has a suﬃciently
high quality compared to the fallback product.
The ﬁrms prefer to locate as far as possible from each other if the products
are of the same quality.21 Therefore, there can only be agglomeration for
intermediate values of ρ where the probability of producing the same quality
is low. The fact that the ﬁrms no longer cluster for high technical risks, i.e.
low values of ρ, is the main diﬀerence to the model with no fallback option.
The ﬁrms beneﬁt from a central location, because it is easier to expand the
market share when producing a higher quality than the competitor. However,
competition is tougher if the ﬁrms are at the same location. Hence, it is
proﬁtable to agglomerate at 1/2 only if the quality diﬀerence between a high
and a low quality ﬁrm is large enough to ensure the high quality ﬁrm a
healthy proﬁtm a r g i n .
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the interaction between ﬁrms’ R&D decisions and
their location choices in product space. In a benchmark model, we consider
the technical risk involved in ﬁrms’ R&D eﬀorts as exogenous and endogenize
t h ep r o j e c t st h a tﬁrms target. We model this by introducing stochastic
R&D in the classical Hotelling model. We show that this might restore
the principle of minimum diﬀerentiation even with quadratic transportation
costs of consumers. The reason is that if R&D success is stochastic, a ﬁrm
only meets a competitor in the product market with a certain probability
and this weakens the centrifugal competition eﬀe c tt h a tn o r m a l l yd o m i n a t e s
the centripetal demand eﬀect. Comparing equilibria to welfare maximizing
locations, we obtain excessive spatial concentration if technical risk is high,
and excessive spatial dispersion otherwise.
We then endogenize technical risk by allowing ﬁrms to choose both the
20Alternatively, this can be interpreted as a situation where ﬁrms have to choose loca-
tions but can pursue both a safe and a risky R&D path.
21Of course, a low quality ﬁrm would prefer to locate as far as possible from a high
quality ﬁrm ex-post. However, ex-ante the ﬁrms are equally likely to be the high and the
low quality ﬁrm. Agglomeration may thus be proﬁtable from an ex-ante point of view if
the high quality ﬁrm wins more from locating together than the low quality ﬁrm loses.
20product characteristics and the degree of riskiness of R&D projects. We show
that this leads to a feedback loop between location choices and technical
risk. More technical risk leads to more clustering, which again makes a risky
project more proﬁtable. We ﬁnd three types of equilibria: (i) ﬁrms stay away
from each other and choose the riskless low quality option, (ii) they cluster
at the center and choose the risky technology, or (iii) they cluster at the
center and diﬀerentiate themselves along the R&D dimension. We show that
a welfare maximizing social planner would always induce at least one ﬁrm to
adopt the risky technology. The equilibria where both ﬁrms adopt the safe
technology are thus ineﬃcient. Finally, from point of view of welfare, ﬁrms
end up both choosing the risky technology too often in equilibrium.
Further extensions of our benchmark model include the incorporation of
patenting, R&D spillovers, and coordination of location decisions within a
research joint venture. Patent protection leads one ﬁrm to win at the cost
of the other, which decreases the competitive pressure and increases cluster-
ing. In sharp contrast to extant arguments, spillovers align the ﬁrms’ R&D
successes and lead to more dispersion. Finally, allowing ﬁrms to coordinate
their object of R&D eﬀorts within a research joint venture brings them to
diﬀerentiate more than in the uncoordinated equilibrium. Unexpectedly, this
may contribute to welfare.
As usual, one can speculate about the consequences of other interesting
extensions. A formal proof must be left for future work. Our argument relies
on the fact that there is a center of the market with high demand as this gives
rise to the demand eﬀect.22 A generalization of the consumer distribution, for
instance, should not aﬀect the results in principle, as long as that distribution
is single peaked (with an interior peak). Eventually, the ﬁrms agglomerate at
the peak rather than in the middle of the market. Another extension could
involve n ﬁrms, n>2. For instance, benchmark levels of ρ could be given
such that for all higher technical risks (i.e. lower ρ), all n ﬁr m sw o u l dc h o s et o
locate at the center of the market. Naturally, ρ would decrease in n.W h i l e
we have shown how patents aﬀect the targeted product varieties through
the strategic interaction of ﬁrms, it would be interesting to analyze socially
optimal patent design (in particular, patent length and breadth) taking into
account the eﬀect on the variety in the market.
It remains to comment on the observability of our results. In real life,
the object of R&D is proprietary information to the ﬁrm. Before its outcome
is revealed, it becomes known, at best, to its competitor(s). Most certainly
it never surfaces in any publicly available statistics. In these statistics, only
22Therefore, there would not be agglomeration in a model such as Salop’s circle model
(Salop, 1979) where demand is the same at all locations.
21the outcomes of research surface, and in many R&D prone areas with heavy
patenting, only the patented ones. Therefore, the strategic choices analyzed
in our model are very hard to observe. Yet we are convinced that we have
modeled important aspects involved in ﬁrms’ R&D choices. This conviction
is reaﬃrmed by informal conversations with insiders into the pharmaceutical
industry. After all, the outcome related data reported in the introduction of
this paper are certainly not in conﬂict with our results.
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24A Proof of Proposition 1
Assume for now that b ≥ 1
2. We verify later that this is satisﬁed in equilib-
rium. The reaction function of ﬁrm i, which indicates the optimal location
as a response to the competitor’s location j,i sd e n o t e dRi(j,ρ), i = A,B
and j = a,b. The expected proﬁto fﬁrm A as a function of (a,b) is given as:
E(ΠA(.)) =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
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18 +( 1− ρ)(q − t(a)2)
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for 1 ≥ a>b .
(13)
From (13), we derive the following two results: 1) any location a ≤ 1 st.
a>bis dominated by the location 1−a,2 )
∂E(ΠA(a,b,q,q,ρ)
∂a < 0 for b ≥ a ≥ 1
2.
These results imply that RA(b,ρ) ∈ [0, 1
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As
∂2E(ΠA(a,b,q,q,ρ))
∂a2 = −ρ(18 − (14 − b − 3a)ρ)t<0,s o l v i n gt h eﬁrst order
condition ﬁnds the optimal location. From (14), and using b ≥ 1
2,w eo b t a i n
the following reaction function of ﬁrm A, RA(b,ρ)=
⎧
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where X ≡ 324 − 36(11 − b)ρ +4 ( 1 9− (7 − b)b)ρ2.I t c a n b e v e r i ﬁed that
RA(b,ρ) ≤ 1
2.
Deriving the reaction function of ﬁrm B in the same way as above, and
25using a ≤ 1
2,w eo b t a i nRB(a,ρ)=
⎧
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where Y ≡ (36−2(10+a)r)2−12(16−a2)r.I tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that RB(a,ρ) ≥
1
2, so the initial assumption b ≥ 1
2 is satisﬁed.
The candidate equilibrium locations, as a function of ρ,a r ef o u n db y
solving the system of equations: RA(b∗,ρ)=a∗ and RB(a∗,ρ)=b∗.I tc a n
be shown that the equilibrium locations described in the proposition are the
only candidate locations satisfying a∗ ∈ [0, 1
2] and b∗ ∈ [1
2,1]. Finally notice
that for b ≤ 1
2, the resulting equilibrium is identical but with the roles of ﬁrm
A and B switched. The equilibrium is thus unique modulo symmetry. ¥
B Proof of Proposition 2
Total welfare in a monopoly where a ﬁrm oﬀers a product of quality q at





(q − t(y − a)
2)dy = q −
t
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+ at(1 − a).
















+ bt(1 − b)+
t
36
(b − a)(2 + a + b)(5b +5 a − 2).
Expected welfare in the economy, EW(a,b), is then deﬁned as
EW(a,b) ≡ ρ
2W
D + ρ(1 − ρ)W
M(a)+( 1− ρ)ρW
M(b).
26Taking the ﬁrst derivatives of this function with respect to the locations a
and b yields the following two necessary conditions:
(4 − a (16 + 15a) − 10ab+5b2) ρ2 t
36
+( 1− 2a)( 1− ρ)ρq =0
and
(32 − 56b +5( a + b)( −a +3b))ρ2 t
36
+( 1− 2b)( 1− ρ)ρq =0 .
Since
∂2EW(a,b)






∂a∂b > 0, these conditions
are also suﬃcient. Thus, solving the two ﬁrst order conditions above for (a,b)
yields the welfare maximizing locations given in the proposition. ¥
C Proof of Lemma 2
If ﬁrm B innovates, it drives ﬁrm A out the market iﬀ. t(b−a)(2+a+b)−∆ ≤
0. Therefore, there exists b such that Firm A stays in the market iﬀ. b ≥ b.









Using equation (10), the expected proﬁto fﬁrm B can be written as:
E(ΠB ((a,S),(b,R))) =
(




Let b ≤ b. Then, ∂E(ΠB(·,·))/∂b < (>)0 for b>(<)a. Hence, there is a






ρ(∆ − (b − a)(4 + a − 3b)t)(∆ +( b − a)(4 − a − b)t)
18(b − a)2 .
This expression is negative if ∆ > (b−a)(4+a−3b)t.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
∆ − (b − a)(4 + a − 3b)t is decreasing in b. We have thus two cases to deal
with. First, if ∆ ≥ 4/3t,
∂E(ΠB(a,S),(b,R)))
∂b < 0 for all a and b ≥ b.U s i n gt h e
result for b ≤ b, we have that the optimal location is b∗ = a.
Consider now ∆ < 4














(2 − a)2t − 3∆.I tc a n
be shown that bH > b for the parameters considered and that bH ≤ 1 for
∆ ≥ (1−a2)t. Thus there exists an interval [Max{bL,b},Min{bH,1}] ⊆ [b,1]
27for which
∂E(ΠB((a,S),(b,R)))
∂b ≥ 0. It follows that there is a local maximum at
b = Min{bH,1}. Again using the result for b ≤ b,t h e r ea r et w ol o c a l
maxima that we need to compare to ﬁnd the optimal location, b = a and
b = Min{bH,1}.
Consider ﬁrst (1 − a2)t ≤ ∆ < 4
3t where bH < 1. Straightforward cal-
culations show that E(ΠB((a,S),(a,R))) − E(ΠB((a,S),(bH,R))) ≥ 0 iﬀ.
Φ(t,a,∆) ≥ 0 where
Φ(t,a,∆) ≡ ∆ −
8(((2 − a)2t − 3∆)3/2 +( 2− a)
√





Φ(t,a,∆) is positive for all ∆ ≥ t
128
¡
−107 − 784a − 128a2 +3 ( 1 7+3 2 a)3/2¢
.
Calculations show that (1−a2)t ≥ t
128
¡
−107 − 784a − 128a2 +3 ( 1 7+3 2 a)3/2¢
.
Therefore, E(ΠB((a,S),(a,R))) − E(ΠB((a,S),(bH,R))) ≥ 0 for all (1 −
a2)t ≤ ∆ < 4
3t,s ob∗ = a.C o n s i d e rn o w(1 − a2)t>∆. Here, we have that
E(ΠB((a,S),(a,R))) − E(ΠB((a,S),(1,R))) ≥ 0 iﬀ. ∆ ≥ (1 − a)(6 + a −
3
√
3+2 a)t where (1 − a2)t ≥ (1 − a)(6 + a − 3
√
3+2 a)t. Proof follows. ¥
DP r o o f o f L e m m a 3
F r o mL e m m a1i tf o l l o w st h a tﬁrm A is driven out the market when ﬁrm B
innovates iﬀ. t(b − a)(2 + a + b) − ∆ ≤ 0. Therefore, there exists an a such






(1 + b)2 − ∆/t
o
.




18t(b−a) +( 1− ρ)(qL − t(Max{a,1 − a})2) for a ≤ a
(1 − ρ)(q − t(Max{a,1 − a})2) for a>a.
If a =0 , ∂E(ΠA((a,S),(b,R)))/∂a > (<)0 for a<(>)1/2.I t f o l l o w s
that the optimal location is a∗ = 1
2.
If 0 < a ≤ 1
2, E(ΠA((a,S),(b,R))) is increasing for 1
2 ≥ a>a and
decreasing for a>1





































From this follows that
∂2E(ΠA((a,S),(b,R)))




b = a +
q
∆
t is the b that minimizes
∂2E(ΠA((a,S),(b,R)))












(9(1 − a) − (5 − a)(2 − a)ρ)
















From ρ ≤ 2
3 it then follows that
∂E(ΠA((a,S),(b,R))
∂a > 0 for all a ≤ a.T h e
optimal location is thus a∗ = 1
2.
Finally, if a>1
2 it follows fromthe argument above that
∂E(ΠA((a,S),(b,R)))
∂a ≥
0 for a ≤ 1
2.C o n s i d e rn o w1




ρ(∆ − t(b − a)(2 + a + b)t)(∆ + t(b − a)(2 + 3a − b)t)




∂a < 0 for a<a≤ b. Hence, a∗ = 1
2. ¥
E Proof of Proposition 3
We denote by E(Πi(sA,s B)), ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt as a function of the two
ﬁrms’ strategies.
Part i) Consider the strategy choice {(1
2,R),(1
2,R)}. We know from
Proposition 1 that if both ﬁrms choose the risky technology, the unique
equilibrium locations are a = b = 1
2. Therefore, we only need to check for
deviations involving the safe technology. It follows from Lemma 3 that the
optimal deviation for ﬁrm A (B, respectively) would be to the strategy (1
2,S).





2,R))), which reduces to ∆ ≥ ∆∗
3.
Part ii) It follows from Lemma 4 that the strategy choice {(1
2,S), (1
2,R)}
(the analysis for {(1
2,R), (1
2,S)} is analogous) is the unique candidate equi-
librium for asymmetric technology choices and ∆ > t
4. Thus, we only need
to consider deviations to a diﬀerent technology. Proposition 1 implies that
the optimal deviation for ﬁrm A is (1
2,R), while it follows from d’Aspremont
et al. that the optimal deviation for ﬁrm B is (1,S). Hence, no devia-








2,S),(1,S))), which reduce to ∆∗
1 ≤ ∆ ≤
∆∗
3. Now consider ∆ ≤ t
4, where the candidate equilibrium is {(1
2,S), (1,R)}.
F r o md ’ A s p r e m o n te ta l .w ek n o wt h a tt h eb e s td e v i a t i o nf o rﬁrm B is (1,S).
Firm B deviates if and only if ∆ ≤ 5t
4 ( 1 √
ρ − 1) which always holds for ρ ≤ 2
3
and ∆ ≤ t
4. Thus, there exists no equilibrium with asymmetric R&D choices
for ∆ ≤ t
4.
Part iii) Consider the strategy choices {(0,S),(1,S)}. From d’Aspremont
et al. it follows that this is the only candidate equilibrium given the tech-
nology choice. Suppose that ﬁrm B (or, alternatively, A)w o u l dc h o o s et h e
technology R. From Lemma 2, it follows that the best deviation is (0,R)
if ∆ ≥ 3(2 −
√
3)t. Therefore, the strategy choices constitute an equilib-
rium iﬀ. ΠD
A((0,S),(1,S)) ≥ ΠD
A((0,S),(0,R)), which reduces to ∆ ≤ t
2ρ.
Consider now ∆ ≤ 3(2 −
√
3)t where the optimal deviation is (1,R).F o r
these parameters, {(0,S),(1,S)} is an equilibrium iﬀ. ΠD
A((0,S),(1,S)) ≥
ΠD
A((0,S),(1,R)) ⇔ ∆ ≤ 3t( 1 √
ρ − 1). Taken together, we get ∆ ≤ ∆∗
2. ¥
F Proof of Corollary 2
Using q = ρ(q + ∆), we can express the quality diﬀerence as ∆ =
1−ρ
ρ q,
which is strictly greater than
(1−ρ)(4q−t)
4ρ . It follows from Proposition 3 that
the unique equilibrium under Assumption 2 is {(1
2,R),(1
2,R)}. ¥
G Proof of Lemma 5
Consider ﬁrst a situation where the ﬁrm with the risky technology (ﬁrm B)i s
unsuccessful. Here, the optimal location of ﬁrm A is 1
2 whereas the location
of ﬁrm B is irrelevant. Consider now the situation where ﬁrm B is successful.
We want to show that in this situation it is optimal to have bW =1 /2 and
ﬁrm B supplying the whole market. We assume that the social planner can



















st.a,b,y≤ 1 and 0 ≤ a,b,y and a ≤ b.
The ﬁrst thing that can be shown is that this program is not concave. We
need thus to check all interior extrema as well as corner solutions. Solving the
program, we ﬁnd that there exists no interior solution (0 <a W,b W,yW < 1)
precisely when ∆ ≥ t/4. The only corner solution is bW =1 /2 and yW =0
whereas the location of ﬁrm A is irrelevant. Using Proposition 1, it follows
that aW = bW =1 /2 are the unique locations that ensure both the optimal
l o c a t i o n sa sw e l la sm a r k e ts h a r e sf o ra l lR & Do u t c o m e s .¥
H Proof of Proposition 4
Expected welfare if both ﬁrms have the safe technology and are located at 1
4
and 3
4, respectively is denoted by WSS and equals




If both ﬁr m sa d o p tt h er i s k yt e c h n o l o g ya n dl o c a t ea ss t a t e di nP r o p o s i t i o n
2a t(aW,b W), the expected welfare, WRR,i sg i v e nb y





Finally, if ﬁrms have diﬀerent R&D technologies and are located at the center
of the line, we get




From this, it follows that






(1 − ρ)(2 − (15 − ρ)ρ)t
48(2 − ρ)2ρ
and that




WRR >W RS ⇐⇒ ∆ > ∆
W
2 (ρ,t).
31In order to show that the ranking of these threshold values is unambiguous
notice that the following ordering holds. If q>e q ≡
(14−29ρ+19ρ2−ρ3)t
48(2−ρ)(1−ρ) ,t h e n
∆W
1 (ρ,t) < ∆W
3 (ρ,t) < ∆W
2 (ρ,t), otherwise we have ∆W
2 (ρ,t) < ∆W
3 (ρ,t) <
∆W
1 (ρ,t). Verify that e q is increasing in ρ and that e q is smaller than 3t for ρ<
2/3. Hence, we know that the ranking is ∆W
1 (ρ,t) < ∆W
3 (ρ,t) < ∆W
2 (ρ,t).
This means that if WRR >W RS, then it also holds that WRR >W SS. And,
from WSS >W RS it follows that WSS >W RR. We thus get the result stated
in Proposition 4. ¥
I Proof of Proposition 5 and 6
We prove that patent protection is leading to more clustering. In the follow-
































Note that the two ﬁrst terms are strictly decreasing in a.T h u s ,i fa ni n t e r i o r
solution exists, it is unique. Moreover, note that any increase in λ leads to
an increase of the absolute value of the two ﬁrst terms. But this implies
that the optimal a increases with λ, i.e. the reaction function of A shifts
(weakly) upwards for any b and (symmetrically and with omitted proof) the
reaction function of B shifts downwards for any a. It follows that in the new
equilibrium ﬁrms are (weakly) more clustered.
With the same line of reasoning, we now show that spillovers are a cen-




A(.)+ρ(1 − ρ)(1 − σ)Π
M
A (.)+2 ρ(1 − ρ)Π
D
A(.)














With the same arguments as above, increasing σ decreases the whole expres-
sion which implies that spillovers lead to equilibria with more diﬀerentiated
products. ¥
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